教育科学 ›› 2019, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (1): 48-53.

• 课程与教学研究 • 上一篇    下一篇

高中学业水平考试改革的困境及突破*——基于委托—代理理论的分析

张善超, 靳玉乐   

  1. 西南大学 教育学部,重庆 北碚 400715
  • 收稿日期:2018-11-28 出版日期:2019-01-15 发布日期:2021-06-17
  • 作者简介:张善超(1986- ),男,河南新乡人,西南大学教育学部博士研究生,研究方向:课程与教学论;|靳玉乐(1966- ),男,河南邓州人,西南大学教育学部教授,博士生导师,研究方向:课程与教学论。
  • 基金资助:
    *国家社会科学基金2018年度教育学一般课题“新高考时代普通高中教师教学胜任力研究”(BHA180161)

The Resistance and Breakthrough Strategies of the Exam Reform of Academic Proficiency for Senior High School——An Analysis Based on Principal-agency Theory

Zhang Shanchao, Jin Yule   

  1. The Faculty of Education, Southwest University, Chongqing 400715, China
  • Received:2018-11-28 Online:2019-01-15 Published:2021-06-17

摘要:

基于委托——代理理论,高中学业水平考试改革中存在多重委托——代理关系链。在委托——代理模式下,改革委托人与代理人间相互博弈产生的逆向选择、道德困境致使改革遭遇认知偏差、治理滞后、执行效率偏低及效果偏离目标的困境。完善改革信息传输渠道、建构有力的激励、监督机制是改革突破上述困境的可行之策。

关键词: 高中学业水平考试改革, 委托——代理关系, 逆向选择, 道德困境, 激励机制

Abstract:

Based on the perspective of principal-agency theory,there are multi-layer principal-agent chains in the Exam Reform of Academic Proficiency for Senior High School.It is adverse selection and moral hazard caused by the dynamic game between the principal and agent at all levels that makes the reform the predicament of the information loss、lagging governance, low efficiency of implementation and deviation of effect from the reform original goals. It is a feasible way to break through the difficulties above by perfecting the information transmission channels, constructing strong incentive mechanisms and supervise mechanisms.

Key words: the Exam Reform of Academic Proficiency for Senior High School, the relationship between principal and agent, adverse selection, moral hazard, incentive mechanism

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